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CHARLES N. BROWER
JOHN B. TEPE, JR.*

The Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States:
A Reflection or Rejection
of International Law?t
Introduction
On December 12, 1974, the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations
General Assembly adopted 120-6-10' a new and controversial Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States (the "Charter") 2 over the vigorous
objections of the United States3 and certain other industrialized countries. Such
a Charter had been proposed by President Luis Echeverria of Mexico, in 1972,
and was drafted under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development ("UNCTAD") with the support and participation of many
States. Debate on the Charter will not subside with its adoption, since that
debate, reflecting continuing essential differences between developing countries
and the industrialized world, is required by the terms of the Charter (Article 34)
to be continued at the next session of the General Assembly, commencing in

*Mr. Brower, a member of the D.C. and New York Bars and formerly Acting Legal Adviser of the
Department of State, and Mr. Tepe, a member of the New York Bar, are Chairman and Secretary,
respectively, of the Subcommittee on Economic Rights and Duties of the Section of International
Law of the American Bar Association. This article is based on the Report on the Charter approved
by the Subcommittee, and, accordingly, the authors wish to express their gratitude to the members
of the Subcommittee.
tSee Documentation section, beginning on page 000 for the Charter itself and relevant
supplementary materials.
'Negative votes were cast by Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg,
the United Kingdom and the United States. Abstaining were Austria, Canada, France, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1974, at 11, col.
I and 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'Ls 265 (1975).
'The full text of the Charter is found commencing at page 28 of the Report of the Second
Committee U.N. Doc. A/9946 (29.U.N. GAOR Supp.-at..,
U.N. Doc. A/-(1974)) and
in U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (xxix), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. -, at (reproduced in 14 INT'L
LEG. MAT'Ls 251 (1975), and is reproduced in the Documents Section of this issue.
3This vote was in accordance with American Bar Association Resolution No. 301 adopted at the
Association's Annual Meeting in August 1974, a copy of which is reproduced in the Documents
Section of this issue.
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September 1975. This article describes the Charter and analyzes its strengths
and weaknesses, touching both on its substantive provisions and on its relationship to international law. Inherent in it are recommendations as to the positions
and actions which the United States should take in any future proceedings
regarding the Charter..
Historical and Procedural Background of the Charter
During the fourteen years the United Nations has been systematically utilized
as a forum in the economic campaign of the developing countries, and despite
the establishment of the U.N. Capital Development Fund, 4 the First U.N.
Development Decade,5 UNCTAD, 6 the Agreed Conclusions of the Special Committee on Trade Preferences, 7 and the Second U.N. Development Decade, 8 the
economic gap between the developing and the developed countries has failed to
narrow significantly. 9 Most developing countries have actually suffered relative
economic shrinkage. 10 This steadily worsening situation has increasingly led to
attempts by the developing countries to obtain a legally binding commitment by
the developed countries to certain economic rights and duties favoring the third
world economies.
Thus, on April 19, 1972, in an address before the 92nd Plenary Meeting of
UNCTAD, the President of Mexico, The Honorable Luis Echeverria Alvarez,
suggested that the international economy should be placed on a "firm legal
footing" 11 through formulation of a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States which might define and protect the economic rights of all countries,
particularly the developing ones, 12 and which might contain some of the following principles:
freedom to dispose of natural resources; the right of every nation to adopt the economic structure it considered most suitable and to treat private property as the public
interest required; renunciation of the use of economic pressures; subjection of foreign
capital to domestic laws; prohibition of interference by supranational corporations in
the internal affairs of States; abolition of trade practices that discriminated against
the exports of non-industrial nations; economic advantages proportionate to levels of

4
G.A.
5

Res. 1706, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
G.A. Res. 1710, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).

'G.A. Res. 1785, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); made permanent

G.A. Res. 1995, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/5815 (1964).
7
U.N. Does. TD/B/329/Add. S--TD/B/AC.5/36/Add. 5 (1970), 10 UNCTADOR Supp. 6A,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/329/Rev. 1-TD/B/AC.5/36/Rev. 1 (1970).
'G.A. Res. 2626, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 39, U.N. Doe. A/8028 (1970).
91d. at Preamble.

1°UNCTAD,

HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS

155, table

5.5 (1969).
"Summary of Address, UNCTAD Proceedings, Third Session, U.N. Doc. TD/180, Vol. 1A, Part
I at 184, 186 (1972).
'U.N. Press Release, TAD/S01. 1 Feb. 1973.
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development; treaties guaranteeing stable and fair prices for basic products; transfer
of technology; and greater economic resources for long-term untied aid.I 3
Taking note of President Echeverria's proposal, UNCTAD resolved on May
18, 1972, in a 90-0-19 vote from which the United States abstained, to establish
a Working Group (the "Working Group") to draft the Charter ". . . to protect
duly the rights of all countries and in particular the developing States . . ."
based on the principles approved by UNCTAD in the final act of its first
session, the principles in the Charter of Algiers and the Declaration and
Principles of the Action Programme of Lima and relevant United Nations
resolutions such as the Strategy for the Second U.N. Development Decade, as
well as any suggestions by its third session. II The Working Group initially was
authorized to meet in two separate sessions in 1973, but due to the difficulty of
the rather large task entrusted to it, its mandate was extended on December 6,
1973 to permit it a third and fourth drafting session." The membership of the
Working Group was authorized by the General Assembly to encompass 40
States. '"
At the outset of Working Group meetings, its Chairman, Ambassador
Castafieda of Mexico, stated that the purpose of the Charter was to "enunciate
authentic economic rights and duties of States in the only way which it is
logically possible to do so: as rights and duties of a juridical nature intended to
be binding if the draft should become part of the corpus of international law."
Therefore the Working Group should "formulate legal, and therefore
obligatory, rights and duties" of States. At the same time, he felt the goal of the
Working Group was not "to formulate a program of action for the United
Nations or the international community," as this function had already been
performed by such events as the Strategy for the Second Development Decade.
Rather the Charter should contain certain principles of a universal nature found
in those instruments insofar as they reflect rights and duties of States. I8 In his
view the Charter should strive to create new rules which would respond to the
present and future needs of the world community, since merely to codify the
existing international economic law "would be tantamount to defending the
maintenance of the status quo, which has certainly not promoted the welfare of

"Summary of Address, supra note 11.
"UNCTAD Res. 45 (111), UNCTAD Proceedings, Third Session, U.N. Doc. TD/180, Vol. I at 58
(1972).
111d.; U.N. Press Release, TAD/S01, 1 Feb. 1973.
"G.A. Res. 3082, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
"Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia.
Denmark, Egypt, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, the USSR, the
United Kingdom, the United States, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia. G.A. Res. 3037, 27 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 30, at 53, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
."Statement by the Chairman of the Working Group, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/R.4, at 2.
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two-thirds of mankind."' 19 Chairman Castahieda acknowledged that for the
Charter to be effective, "it should be an instrument fundamentally acceptable
to, or at least tolerated by, all the main groups of States." 20 Conscious of the
disagreements likely to arise during the creation of new norms and the
expansion of the corpus of international law, the Chairman foresaw that the
principal function of the Working Group would be to "negotiate opposing views
and to find common denominators for divergent national interests."'" He
recognized and encouraged the role of the developing countries as providing the
stimulus for change.22
At the first session of the Working Group held in Geneva from February 1223, 1973,23 the developing countries immediately took the initiative in offering
suggestions and four working papers were sponsored by various groups in
addition to a consolidated proposal prepared by some of the sponsors of the
other working papers, all of which were referred to a subgroup of 18 States
which prepared a draft Charter.24 At its second session, also held in Geneva,
from July 13-27, 1973, the Working Group, after considering the comments of
31 States, established two subgroups to draft the Charter through a synthesis of
the outline framed at the first session and the comments made at the second
session. 25 Based on the texts drafted by these subgroups Chairman Castafieda
26
submitted an informal consolidated draft of the Charter.
Notwithstanding its abstention from voting on the UNCTAD resolution
establishing the Working Group, the United States participated as a member of
the Working Group. Dr. Henry Kissinger, making his first address to the
General Assembly shortly after being installed as Secretary of State in October
'91d.
Id. at 3.

2

2 Ild.

"Id.; see Comment, Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Solution to the
Development Aid Program, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 441, 451-452 (1974).
3
Report of the Working Group on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States on its
first session, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/1 (the "First Report").
2
'd. at 15; U.N. Docs. TD/B/AC.12/R.6 and Add. 1, R.8, R.10, and R.11; Comment, supra
note 22 at 453.
"Report of the Working Group on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States on its
second session, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC. 12/2 (the "Second Report") at 65 (comments consolidated in
U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC. 12/2/Add. 1). Subgroup I considered the preamble and Chapters I and III of
the Charter and included [emphasis indicates participation in drafting group] Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica,Japan, Kenya, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, USSR, United Kingdom,
United States, Yugoslavia and Zaire. Subgroup II considered Chapter II of the Charter and
included [emphasis indicates participation in drafting group] Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile,
China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala,
Hungary, India. Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, the
Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, USSR, United Kingdom,
United States, Yugoslavia and Zaire.
"Id. at 45.
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1973, just over two months after the Working Group had completed its second
session, pledged the United States to "examine seriously" the various Charter
proposals and to continue participation in the Working Group. Secretary Kissinger warned, however, that the rights and duties proposed by the Working
Group must "reflect the true aspirations of all nations [and] be defined
equitably and take into account the concerns of industrialized as well as of
developing countries," and that "if [the Charter] is turned into an indictment of
one group of countries by another it will accomplish nothing." 27
The efforts of the two subgroups of the Working Group continued at its third
and fourth sessions held in Geneva on February 4-22, 1974 and in Mexico City
during June 10-28, 1974. At these sessions further elaboration and refinement
of the Charter occurred with the result that the text of only a few significant
provisions remained unagreed upon; disagreement on these provisions,
however, was fundamental. 2 8
After further informal consultations among Working Group Members at
United Nations Headquarters in New York and elsewhere a final draft of the
Charter was submitted to the Second Committee of the General Assembly at its
twenty-ninth session in the Fall of 1974. There debates continued (and
remained unresolved) on the text of several key provisions. With a view to
gaining time for additional negotiations that might lead to universal acceptance
of the Charter a group of nine industrialized States2 9 proposed a resolution in
the Second Committee requesting further consultations before submission of
the Charter to the General Assembly. 30 That resolution was defeated 81-20-1531
and on December 6, 1974 the Second Committee resolved to submit the Charter
to the General Assembly."
The United States voted "with deep regret" against submission of the Charter
to the General Assembly in its still unagreed state. 33 The United States pointed
out that only a few unagreed provisions remained, but that as a result the draft
Charter was imbalanced, failed to encourage harmonious economic relations or
much needed development, and, indeed, discouraged rather than encouraged
the capital flow which is vital for such development." In conclusion the United

"69

DEP'T STATE BULL. 472 (Oct. 15, 1973).
"Report of the Working Group on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States on its
third session, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.12/3 (the "Third Report"), and on its fourth session, U.N.
Doc. TD/B/AC.12/4 (the "Fourth Report").
"Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
"Report of the Second Committee, supra note 2 at 20.
"Id. at 21.
"Id. at 26.
"Statement by Senator Charles H. Percy, U.S. Representative in Committee II, Press Release
USUN-1920 (74).
"Id. at 2.
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States suggested that it might reconsider its vote in the future if additional
negotiations could reach an agreed consensus on those issues vital to "countries
whose numbers may be small but whose significance in economic relations and
development can hardly be ignored." 35 Notwithstanding the opposition, as
noted above (see text at note 1), the Charter was adopted by the General
Assembly on December 12, 1974 by the overwhelming vote of 120-6-10.
The Non-Binding Character of the Charter
It was the original intent of the sponsors of the Charter that it be a legally
binding document. However, particularly as the divergence of opinion between
the developing and developed States on a variety of sensitive and sometimes
non-economic issues raised by the developing States became apparent at the
first session of the Working Group, some participants grew to oppose the
concept of creating in the Charter, legally binding obligations. For example, the
United States representative expressed doubt as to the "advisability, possibility
or feasibility of making the rights and duties formulated in a draft Charter
legally binding on States." 3 6 He added that "while developed countries were not
indifferent to the problems of developing countries, States might not be
prepared at present to give up the degree of sovereignty that acceptance of such
sweeping juridical commitments might imply." 37
In order to permit the Working Group to concentrate on its primary function
of formulating substantive economic rights and duties of States, it was decided
at the first meeting of the second session of the Working Group not to reopen
discussion of the legal nature of the final instrument but rather to leave the
question of the Charter's legal force to the General Assembly.38 Nonetheless,
indirect reference to its potentially binding nature appeared in the draft Charter
presented to the Second Committee of the General Assembly. It was declared in
the fourth preambular paragraph that "it is a fundamental purpose of this
Charter to codify and develop rules for the establishment of the new international economic order

. . ."9

and in the last preambular paragraph that "the

General Assembly solemnly adopts the present Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States as a first step in the codification and progressive development of
this subject."" °
Eventually, in apparent recognition of the fact that the Charter was no longer
intended necessarily to be a legally binding instrument, the representative of
Mexico before the Second Committee, on behalf of the Charter's sponsors,
"Id.
"First Report, supra note 23 at para. 19.
"Id. at para. 28.
"Second Report, supra note 25 at 3.
"Report of the Second Committee, supra note 2 at 3 (emphasis added).
"0Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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introduced revisions whereby the words "to codify and develop rules for" in the
fourth preambular paragraph were replaced by the words "to promote" and
whereby the words in the last preambular paragraph reading "as a first step in
the codification and progressive development of this subject" were deleted. .4'1
These revisions were adopted by the Second Committee without negative vote. 42
Similarly, and in apparent further confirmation of the non-binding status of the
Charter, the representative of Mexico before the Second Committee, on behalf
of the sponsors, offered a revision whereby the reference to "obligations" under
the Charter in subparagraph (c) of the fifth preambular paragraph of the draft
Charter presented to the Second Committee43 was modified so that reference
would be made instead to the "provisions" of the Charter.4" This modification,
too, was adopted by the Second Committee without opposition. 4 5
The transitional language bridging the preamble and Chapter I of the
Charter (i.e., "solemnly adopts the present Charter

. .

.") does not in itself

establish any binding legal effect of the Charter, although it might be noted that
the United States had suggested as an alternative the even more clearly nonbinding phrase "solemnly declares the following principles.""6
The non-binding nature of the Charter is evidenced by several other facts as
well. First, the United States and several major economic powers constituting a
very substantial portion of the world economic community voted against the
Charter at the time of its adoption; a larger number abstained. Such votes
express the unwillingness of those major powers to consent either expressly or by
implication to all of the rights and duties set forth in the Charter. Secondly, a
General Assembly resolution, which is not a multilateral convention or treaty,
will in any event normally have only recommendatory force. Although at least
one writer considers General Assembly resolutions to have a moral force that "is
in fact a nascent legal force which may enjoy ... a twilight existence hardly distinguishable from morality and justice until the time when the imprimatur of
the world community will attest to its jural quality, ' 47 the more commonly
accepted opinion is that voiced by Professor Brierly that all the General Assembly can do is discuss and recommend and that the effect of these recom48
mendations is only moral, not legal.

"Id.

at 20.

'"d.
at 23, 24.
3

41d. at 4.
"Id. at 19.
"Id. at 23.
'Second Report, Add. 1, supra note 25 at 47; for a discussion of the relative effect of a General
Assembly "recommendation" or "declaration" see Comment, supra note 22 at 460.
"Sloane, The Binding Force of a "Recommendation" of the General Assembly of the United
Nations,. 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1948).
19. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 110 (6th ed. 1963); U.N. Charter, Article 10; for additional
discussion of this point see Comment, supra note 22 at 459-460; but see J. CASTANEDA, LEGAL
EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (Amoia transl. 1969).
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Having established that the Charter is not a legally binding instrument, one
might justifiably inquire why the third world States pressed for quick passage of
a very broad and groundbreaking statement of principles, when they recognized
that such an approach would preclude agreement on the Charter having legal
effect. One might equally inquire as to why developed countries evidenced such
strong resistance to certain Charter provisions given their lack of direct legal
force. The answer is clear on both counts. The strategy behind the Charter came
to be a desire to develop in the Charter a statement of principles which, even if
not legally binding, could be construed by those States which reject traditional
international law as a statement of international law. Certain States which do
not accept traditional views of what constitutes international law might indeed
go further and express the position, in their municipal courts and possibly elsewhere, that the Charter actually reflects a new standard of international law. At
the very least the Charter could serve as a pressure on future international lawmaking. Lacking ability to achieve more favorable binding agreements with
developed states through bilateral or multilateral negotiations of a more
concrete character, the developing states have resorted to the creation of the
Charter as a means of generating an impression of general international support
for a movement toward principles not embraced by the current body of
traditional international law. Through this procedure, the third world nations
evidently hope to upset or at least alter the direction of current specialized and
pragmatic negotiations in a variety of fields (cf, GATT, IMF, and the Third
U.N. Law of the Sea Conference) which eventually will result in legally binding
conclusions.
The Weakening Effect of the Charter
on International Law
The most fundamental weakness of the Charter is its overall failure to state
clearly that the economic rights and duties of States are subject to international
law or at least that international law is pertinent. Indeed, this is the position
taken by the American Bar Association in its Resolution No. 301.11 The initial
relevant reference, the citation in paragraph (j) of Chapter I of the Charter of
the principle of "fulfillment in good faith of international obligations" as a
governing principle in international relations, is unfortunately ambiguous. The
term "international obligations" as used in Chapter I is open to the interpretation that it includes only freely accepted contractual obligations rather
than international law as a whole. It is unclear, for example, whether the term
includes obligations under customary international law. By way of clarification
the United States unsuccessfully suggested limiting the reference in Chapter I to

"See note 3 supra.
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"good faith fulfillment of obligations assumed by States in accordance with the
[U.N.] Charter."5
Other references to the "international obligations" of States appear in only
three of the 34 articles of the Charter: "
Article 4. In the pursuit of international trade and other forms of economic cooperation, every State is free to chose the forms of organization of its foreign economic
relations and to enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements consistent with its
internationalobligations and with the needs of international economic cooperation.
Article 12(1). States have the right, in agreement with the parties concerned, to participate in subregional, regional and interregional co-operation in the pursuit of their
economic and social development. All States engaged in such co-operation have the
duty to ensure that the policies of those groupings to which they belong correspond to
the provisions of the Charter and are outward-looking, consistent with their international obligationsand with the needs of international economic co-operation and have
full regard for the legitimate interests of third countries, especially developing countries.
Article 22(1). All States should respond to the generally recognized or mutually agreed
development needs and objectives of developing countries by promoting increased net
flows of real resources to the developing countries from all sources, taking into account
any obligations and commitments undertaken by the States concerned, in order to

reinforce the efforts of developing countries to accelerate their economic and social
development.
Article 22(2). In this context, consistent with the aims and objectives mentioned above
and taking into account any obligations and commitments undertaken in this regard,

it should be their endeavour to increase the net amount of financial flows from official
sources to developing countries and to improve the terms and conditions. [emphasis
added throughout]
As a whole the other provisions of the Charter are open to the negative inference
that expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and hence that they are not subject to

international law, notwithstanding the reference in Chapter I, paragraph (j) to
"international obligations."
The failure of the Charter fundamentally to accord to international law its
proper governing role in international relations is compounded by the
substantial efforts made in substantive provisions of the Charter to undermine
existing rules of international law believed by less developed countries to be
insufficiently biased in their direction. For these reasons in particular a
"°Second Report, Add. 1,supra note 25 at 47.
Arguably one should include also Article 21:
Developing countries should endeavor to promote the expansion of their mutual trade and to
this end, may, in accordance with the existing and evolving provisions and procedures of
internationalagreement where applicable, grant trade preferences to other developing countries
without being obliged to extend such preferences to developed countries, provided these
arrangements do not constitute an impediment to general trade liberalization and expansion.
5

[emphasis added]
Its reach, however, limited to "international agreements," would be narrower than "international
obligations," assuming the latter encompassed "international law" generally.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 9, No. 2
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coalition of fourteen nations52 in varying constellations unsuccessfully offered a
series of eighteen different amendments to the draft Charter in the Second
Committee largely directed to conforming the Charter to their understanding of
current international law.
The Battle Over Article 2: Expropriation
and Permanent Sovereignty
The highlight of Charter debate, throughout the labors of the Working
Group, the informal consultations, and the Second Committee, was, and
doubtless will continue to be, Article 2. A more detailed analysis of this Article
is merited both because of its substantive importance, and as an instructive
example of the relationship of the Charter, non-binding though it may be, to
international law.
It long has been common currency that international law provides with
respect to expropriation, as set forth in the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965), that:
§ 185. The taking by a state of property of an alien is wrongful under international law
if (a) it is not for a public purpose, [or] (b) there is not reasonable provision for the
determination and payment of just compensation, as defined in § 187, under the law
and practice of the state in effect at the time of taking.
§ 187. Just compensation .. .must be (a) adequate in amount .
(b) paid with
reasonable promptness . . ., and (c) paid in a form that is effectively realizable by the
alien, to the fullest extent that the circumstances permit....
These principles were confirmed by the General Assembly itself in 1962 when
it adopted G.A. Resolution 1803 (XVII), the Declaration on Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources:
In such cases [nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning] the owner shall be paid
appropriate compensation, in accordance with rules in force in the State taking such
measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law."5
In the full context of adoption of G.A. Resolution 1803 (XVII) the words
"appropriate compensation" could only mean prompt, adequate and effective
compensation." There is no doubt that this is a mandatory obligation under
international law, that such compensation "shall" be paid."5

"Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany. Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.
s17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at IS,U.N. Doe. A/5217 (1962).
"U.S.U.N. Press Release No. 4091 at 6, cited in Schwebel, The Story of the U.N. 'sDeclaration
on PermanentSovereignty Over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463, 465 (1963).
5
See text at note 53; for a discussion of custom as evidenced by arbitration decisions see W.
Friedmann, 0. Lissitzen & R. Pugh, INT'L L. at 807-812 (1969) ("Friedmann").
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Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter, however, provides only that "appropriate
compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into
account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State
considers pertinent." Thus the only obligation, prefaced with the precatory
rather than mandatory "should," is to grant such compensation, if any, as is
subjectively thought to be "appropriate," considering only local law and
"circumstances" to which international law is not necessarily "pertinent." Nor
is there even an intimation that a taking need be for a public purpose.
The utter rejection of international law, both in substance and as a relevant
source of governing authority (regardless of content), is underscored by the
express provision that:
[i]n any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be
settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it
is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be
sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the
principle of free choice of means.
Clearly this dispenses with international adjudication based on international
law, except on a fully negotiated basis, and then possibly only as between States,
and not as to any State's dispute with a national of another State.
Starting at the earliest sessions of the Working Group the United States made
known that notwithstanding that every State exercises permanent sovereignty
over its natural resources and may dispose of them freely and fully it could not
accept the provisions of the Charter declaring that nationalization is an
expression of sovereign power solely within the jurisdiction of that State. Instead
it felt that a State must remain within the framework of international law in the
disposition of its natural resources and that appropriate compensation should
be provided upon nationalization of foreign property as required by
international law.

56

It has been traditionally thought also that any taking of property of an alien
by a State must not be discriminatory in nature, otherwise international law is
violated. 57 This is simply a particular application of the broader principles of
international law precluding discriminatory treatment of aliens not based on a
rational distinction, 8 which is ordinarily reflected in treaties of friendship,
"Second Report, Add. 1, supra note 25 at 48.
"Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1961), affg., 193 F. Supp.
(S.D.N.Y.); this reasoning was adopted in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied. 390 U.S. 1037 (1968).

"See

ALl,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

at

§§ 165, 166; also Sohn and Baxter, Draft Convention on the InternationalResponsibility of States
forlnjuries toAliens, 55 A.J.1.L. 545, Arts. 12()(b) and 12(4)(2) (1961); FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT
GUARANTEE TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 249-51
NATIONAL LAW 189-92 (1953); 3 HACKWORTH

(1962); S. FRIEDMANN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTER555, 654, and 1948 Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (adopted 48-0-8), G.A. Res. 217, 3 GAOR, at 71, Art. 17(2), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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commerce and navigation to which the United States is a party. 9 Yet nowhere
does Article 2 record, or even make a genuflection toward, this established
principle. It is quick to provide, in Article 2(2)(a), that "No State shall be
compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign investment," but fails to
include the natural corollary of non-discrimination.
There is also substantial authority to the effect that when a State enters into a
concession agreement or other contract, whether with another State or a
national of another State, regarding the importation of capital, it is bound to
observe it in good faith; in effect it has waived its right of expropriation to the
extent such action would be inconsistent with the contractual terms. The
essence of claims by less developed countries to "permanent sovereignty" over
natural resources, however, is a desire to establish, as a matter of right, the
violability of such agreements. The General Assembly itself resolved this
conflict in 1962 by confirming, in its Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty
Over Natural Resources, that:
[iln cases where authorization is granted, the capital imported and the earnings on
that capital shall be governed by the terms thereof, by the national legislation in force,
and by international law.

Foreign investment agreements 6freely
entered into by, or between, sovereign states
0
shall be observed in good faith.

That Declaration recalled that the General Assembly had specified that "due
regard should be paid to the rights and duties of States under international law"
in the underlying work of its Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources. 61
In respect to inviolability of contracts the Charter is likewise deficient, for
Article 2(1), without any deference to international law, boldly proclaims without limitation that:

"See Friedmann, supra note 55 at 777, n. 2.
"G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), supra note 53 at §§ 3 and 8.
6
See also the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res.
2200, 21 GAOR Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, which provides:
Article 1(2). All peoples may for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation,
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and internationallaw. In no case may a people be
deprived of its own means of subsistance." [emphasis added]
An identical Article 1 appears in the International Convention on Economic, Social & Cultural
Rights of Dec. 16, 1966 (G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316). Likewise
the Convention on Settlement of International Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States (17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159) refers to international law for
the settlement of disputes:
Art. 42(1) The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with the rules of law as may be
agreed by the parties. In the absense of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the
Contracting State party to the disputes (including its rules on conflict of laws) and such rules of
internationallaw as may be applicable. [emphasis added]
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Article 2(1). Every state has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.
This failure to honor the traditional sanctity of contract had motivated the
United States as early as the second session of the Working Group to propose an
alternative text, as follows:
All States have the right, within theframework of internationallaw, freely and fully to
dispose of their natural resources in the interests of the economic development and
well-being of their peoples. 62 [emphasis added]
The United States also suggested the following text:
The regulation and control of foreign investment shall be in accordance with internationallaw. Due regard shall be given to the benefits for economic development of
such investment. 63 [emphasis added]
Even these generalized references, far less specific than the above-cited
provisions of the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources, could not achieve acceptance.
The pronounced rejection of international law both in the abstract and in
substance plainly evidenced by the text of Article 2 as it was proposed in the
Second Committee (and ultimately adopted by the General Assembly) led a
group of fourteen industrialized countries, 6 4 including the United States, to
propose a complete substitute for Article 2 embodying a more legal approach.
The proposed text was perhaps less specific and forceful than the U.N.'s 1962
Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources. That this is so
reflected the genuine willingness of these countries to cooperate toward the
adoption of a universally accepted Charter. The proposed text was as follows: 65
Article 2
1. Every State has permanent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources and
has the inalienable right fully and freely to dispose of them.
2. Each State has the right:
(a) To enact legislation and promulgate rules and regulations, consistent with its
development objectives, to govern the entry and activities within its territory of
foreign enterprises;
(b) To enter freely into undertakings relating to the import of foreign capital which
shall be observed in good faith;
(c) To regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations within its
national jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities will comply
62
Second
63

Report, Add. 1, supra note 25 at 48.
1d. at 50.
1 Australia, Belguim, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.
"Report of the Second Committee, supra note 2 at 16.
4
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fully with its laws, rules and regulations and conform with its economic and
social policies. Every State shall ensure that transnational corporations enjoy
within its national jurisdiction the same rights and fulfill the same obligations as
any other foreign person. Transnational corporations shall not intervene in the
internal affairs of a host State. Every State should, with full regard for its sovereign rights, co-operate with other States in the exercise of the right set forth in
this subparagraph;
(d) To nationalize, expropriate or requisition foreign property for a public purpose,
provided that just compensation in the light of all relevant circumstances shall
be paid;
(e) To require that its national jurisdiction be exhausted in any case where the treatment of foreign investment or compensation therefor is in controversy, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties;
(f) To settle disputes where so agreed by the parties concerned through negotiation,
good offices, inquiry, fact-finding, conciliation, mediation, arbitration or judicial settlement, on the basis of the principles of sovereign equality of States and
free choice of means.
3. States taking measures in the exercise of the foregoing rights shall fulfil in good
faith their international obligations.
Thus the compromise proposed would specifically require that expropriation
be for a public purpose, and that "just compensation in the light of all relevant
circumstances shall be paid." Proposed Article 2(2)(c) (second sentence) would
have prescribed the principle of non-discrimination, at least among transnational corporations. Further, proposed Article 2(2)(b) would have required
that investment agreements with aliens "be observed in good faith." Most
critically, proposed Article 2(3) would have subjected the exercise of all rights
encompassed by Article 2 to the duty of States to "fulfill in good faith their
international obligations." Despite the arguable ambiguity of the phrase
"international obligations," adoption of this phrase, amplified by appropriate
explanations of vote and other "legislative history," would have gone very far
towards making the Charter as a whole justifiably acceptable to the industrialized world.
The crucial vote establishing the high water mark for supporters of
international law in the Charter debates occurred with respect to the proposed
Article 2(3) on "international obligations." Twenty countries voted for the
substitute and 18 more abstained. Seventy-one votes were cast against it. 66 On
no other significant amendment seeking to import international law into the
Charter, either abstractly or in concrete form, was greater support than this
achieved. After the defeat of proposed Article 2(3) the accompanying proposed
Articles 2(1) and (2) were rejected 87-19-11.67 Thus was the stage set for the

11d. at 22.
61d.
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failure of the Charter to achieve the universal acceptance for which its sponsors
had originally hoped.

68

Charter Provisions Expressly Favoring
Developing Countries
In a more generalized fashion, many articles in the Charter are devoted to
calling upon the international community to favor or give preferences to
"developing countries" in various aspects of international economic and trade
matters. These provisions reflect the fundamental thrust of the strategy of the
developing countries to create through the Charter an international atmosphere
more favorable to their cause and to influence international relations and negotiations to their advantage. The attitude of cooperative compromise brought to
Charter discussions by the developed countries is evidenced by the fact that
most of their objections to these provisions were abandoned during the course of
negotiations within the Working Group. Indeed, unless indicated otherwise, the
articles discussed below were adopted without negative vote by the Second
Committee.
A. General Provisions RegardingEconomic Progress
and Accelerated Development
Article 8, for example, provides that "States should cooperate in facilitating
more rational and equitable international economic relations and in encouraging structural changes. .. in harmony with the needs and interests of all
countries, especially developing countries. .. ."
Similarly, Article 9 notes the responsibility of States "to cooperate in the
economic, social, cultural, scientific and technological fields for the promotion
of ...

progress . . . especially that of the developing countries."

In Article 11 all States are urged to cooperate to strengthen, improve and
adapt international organizations in order that measures may be implemented
"to stimulate the general economic progress of all countries, particularly of
developing countries.
Likewise Article 13 encourages the transfer of technology to the developing
countries with proper regard for all legitimate interests including, inter alia, the
rights and duties of holders, suppliers and recipients of technology. In
particular, all States are encouraged to facilitate "the access of developing
countries to the achievements of modern science and technology, the transfer of
technology and the creation of indigenous technology for the benefit of the
developing countries in forms and in accordance with the procedures which are
suited to their economies and their needs."
"An amendment to Article 30 proposed by eight countries including the United States would
have tied the responsibility of States for pollution to "pertinent international norms, regulations and
obligations." Id. at 18. It was rejected by a vote of 91-22-12. Id. at 23.
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In Article 17 every State is urged to cooperate with the efforts of developing
countries "by extending active assistance to them . . . with strict respect for the
sovereign equality of States and free of any conditions derogating from their
sovereignty."
A final general provision, Article 24, requires that in the conduct of their
mutual economic relations all States "should avoid prejudicing the interests of
developing countries."
B. ProvisionsRegarding Trade and Tariffs
Several articles expressly address trade and tariff questions, urging that the
general bias toward developing countries which underlies the Charter specifically be applied to such issues. Article 14 of the Charter is particularly forthright in
this regard. It broadly urges the "expansion and liberalization of world trade
and an improvement in the welfare and living standards of all peoples, in
particular those of developing countries." States are encouraged to cooperate
"towards the progressive dismantling of obstacles to trade" and towards the
solution of the trade problems of all countries "taking into account the specific
trade problems of the developing countries." In this connection, States are
required "to take measures aimed at securing additional benefits for the
international trade of developing countries so as to achieve a substantial
increase in their foreign exchange earnings, the diversification of their exports,
the acceleration of the rate of growth of their trade, taking into account their
development needs, an improvement in the possibilities for these countries to
participate in the expansion of world trade and a balance more favorable to
developing countries in the sharing of the advantages resulting from this
expansion, through, in the largest possible measure, a substantial improvement
in the conditions of access for the products of interest to the developing
countries and, wherever appropriate, measures designed to attain stable,
equitable and remunerative prices for primary products."
The Charter often highlights what its sponsors regard as particular problem
areas. Thus the Charter provides in Article 27 that "the role of developing
countries in world invisible trade should be enhanced and strengthened ....
particular attention being paid to the special needs of developing countries,"
and all States are urged to "cooperate with developing countries in their
endeavors to increase their capacity to earn foreign exchange from invisible
transactions."
Article 18 more specifically concerns tariffs. It encourages the extension of
generalized non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory tariff preferences to the
developing countries. Developed countries are also urged to "give serious consideration to the adoption of other differential measures, in areas where this is
feasible and appropriate and in ways which will provide special and more
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favorable treatment, in order to meet trade and development needs of the
developing countries."
The developing countries expanded the concept of such preferential rights in
Article 19 by encouraging generalized preferential, non-reciprocal and nondiscriminatory "treatment" to the developing countries, rather than just "tariff
preferences." The broad scope, and potentially wide-ranging consequences, of
such a provision caused fourteen industrialized States to call for the deletion of
Article 19 in the Second Committee debates,69 but their resolution was defeated
7
102-17-5 . 0
Finally, in Article 21 developing countries are permitted to promote the
expansion of their mutual trade through the granting of trade preferences to
each other "without being obligated to extend such preferences to developed
countries, provided these arrangements do not constitute an impediment to
general trade liberalization and expansion." Similarly Article 23 admonishes
developing countries to "expand their mutual trade" in order to mobilize their
own resources, and urges developed countries to provide appropriate and effective support and cooperation vis-i-vis trade between developing countries.
C. Special Interest Pleas: The Least Developed
Countries and Non-Market Economies
It is natural in a document which has as its main theme the granting of
economic advantage to developing countries that special emphasis be accorded
the most disadvantaged of this group. Thus Article 25 requires all countries,
and developed countries in particular, to pay special attention to the needs and
problems of "the least developed among the developing countries, of landlocked developing countries and also island developing countries."
Two articles appear to be directed to the particular interests of the Soviet
Union and its affiliated States. Article 20 urges developing countries to "give
due attention to the possibility of expanding their trade with socialist countries"
by granting them "conditions for trade not inferior to those granted normally to
the developed market economy countries." In Article 26, a duty was imposed on
all States to "coexist in tolerance and live together in peace, irrespective of
differences in political, economic, social and cultural systems, and to facilitate
trade between States having different economic and social systems." The Article
20 call for universal most-favored national treatment, which is an important
socialist issue, was reiterated here as well. These two articles were the object of
some negative votes and abstentions (Article 20: 110-1-12; Article 26:
1
105-14-10)."

"Report of the Second Committee, supra note 2 at 18.
7
ld. at 23.
"Id. at 25. These articles represent the only manifestation of a distinct Soviet viewpoint.
Otherwise, the Soviet Union and its associates tended simply to support the developing countries.
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D. Development Assistance: The Muted Appeal
When the proposal for a Charter was first initiated, many developed countries
were concerned that it would become an instrument designed to establish the
mandatory entitlement of developing countries to direct financial aid. While the
Charter urges the international manifestation of a distinct preference for
developing countries in economic affairs, it has carefully hewed to this theme,
and abjured any pronounced insistence on outright aid. The developing
countries have expressed their desires and needs largely in terms of the indirect
aid afforded by preferential trade and economic arrangements, uncompensated
expropriation and the like. Accordingly, the Article most clearly addressed to
aid, Article 22, promotes "increased net flows of real resources to the
developing countries," and urges States "to increase the net amount of financial
flows from official sources to developing countries" including "economic and
technical assistance."
Charter Provisions on Freedom of Choice, Freedom to
Participate and Freedom from Coercion
Complementary to the Charter's general theme of preferring the interests of
developing countries is that of guaranteeing the freedom of action of developing
countries. This theme is most broadly sounded in Article 1 of the Charter, which
provides:
Every state has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as
well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.
This theme is defined with more specificity in succeeding articles in Chapter
II of the Charter. For example, Article 4 provides that, "In the pursuit of
international trade and other forms of economic cooperation, every State is free
to choose the forms of organization of its foreign economic relations," 72 and in
Article 7 each State is reserved "the right and the responsibility to choose its
means and goals of development, fully to mobilize and use its resources, to
implement progressive economic and social reforms and to ensure the full
participation of its people in the process and benefits of development." 73
Corollary to the freedom of choice is the freedom to participate in international decision making. In this regard Article 10 provides that all States are
juridically equal and "have the right to participate fully and effectively in the
72

This article was the subject of eight negative votes and seven abstentions. Report of the Second
Committee, supra note 2 at 25.
' 3Because of its failure to include any reference to international law, Article 7 could be interpreted
to mean that individual States may assert purely domestic reasons for disregarding their obligations
under international law (see, U.S. Comment, Second Report, Add. 1, supra note 25 at 48).
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international decision-making process in the solution of world economic,
financial and monetary problems .. " Similarly Article 12 recognizes the right
of States "to participate in subregional, regional and interregional cooperation
in the pursuit of their economic and social development." It is noteworthy here,
however, that Article 12(1) also expresses an obligation on the part of such
regional groups to conform their policies to the Charter. 1
Matching the principles of freedom of choice and freedom to participate is a
prohibition against coercion. The subject of the legal use of economic and
political coercion by States is a current topic of much discussion, 7" however,
touched off by events ranging from Chilean expropriations to the Arab oil
boycott. New language in the Charter concerning coercion could have raised or
rekindled a number of troublesome questions. For example, would the Charter
condone coercive steps undertaken in self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter or as otherwise permitted under international law? There was
some unresolved debate within the Working Group as to whether the term
"coercion" would include the withholding of commodities or goods from trade,
the withholding or withdrawal of loans, grants, GATT tariff concessions, or
most-favored nation treatment, or a State's voting against a loan by an inter74
' Article 12(2) extends the force of the Charter to any of the groupings mentioned in Article 12 "to
which the States concerned have transferred or may transfer certain competences as regards matters
that come within the scope of this Charter," but due to a revision in Article 12, apparently proposed
to the Second Committee by the sponsors at the behest of those States which are members of the
European Economic Community, the Chapter is limited in such cases to be "consistent with the
responsibilities of such States as members of such groupings."
'"See, Comment, The Use of Non-Violent Coercion: A Study in Legality UnderArticle2(4) of the
Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (1974). Current resolutions and provisions
on coercion are diverse. The Declaration of the Inadmissability of Intervention into the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty. (G.A. Res. 2131, 20
GAOR Supp. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) adopted 109-0-1 (U.K. abstaining) provides:
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to
coerce another State in order to obtain from it subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights
or to secure from it advantages of any kind.
In addition, the Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security
(G.A. Res. 2993 of December 15, 1972, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972)),
prohibits coercion as follows:
4 .... any measure or pressure directed against any State while exercising its sovereign right
freely to dispose of its natural resources constitutes a flagrant violation of the principles of
self-determination of peoples and non-intervention, as set forth in the (U.N.] Charter, which if
pursued, could constitute a threat to international peace and security.
Identical language had been previously adopted by UNCTAD in its Resolution 46(111) of May 18,
1972 (UNCTAD Proceedings, Third Session, U.N. Doc. TD/180, Vol. I at 59 (1972)).
No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political
characer in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any
kind.
This sentiment was restated in 1973 by resolution of the Inter-American Economic and Social
Council (CIES/Res./50 (VIII-73)) as follows:
10. . . .Coercive measures of any kind are incompatible with the terms of Chapters IV and VII
of the Charter of the OAS.
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national financial institution. For example, would the Hickenlooper Amendment constitute coercion when it forbids the extension of further foreign aid to
States which expropriate U.S. property without taking appropriate steps to
provide full compensation therefor? Could the United States invoke the Charter
against the Mideast petroleum boycott or other commodity boycotts?
As a result, it was determined that the Charter should not disturb the status
quo as set forth in the U.N. Friendly Relations Declaration and the Charter
simply repeats language from that Declaration as Article 32:76
No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of
measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the
exercise of its sovereign rights.
This solution has not answered any of the many hypothetical questions which
have been current in recent years regarding coercion, but by simply reiterating a
text which has been widely accepted as reflecting international law it at least
had the virtue of not giving rise to any new questions."
Charter Provisions Justifying Commodity Cartels
Additional specific expression of the Charter's bias toward developing
countries is found in a series of provisions which memorialize the right of
developing countries to engage in concerted action in the disposition of their
natural resources. The predictable sensitivity of developed countries to the
effects of international commodity cartelization, particularly in the wake of the
1973-74 oil embargo, resulted in sharp reaction. Following the dispute over
Article 2, this was the second most contested area, resulting in unsuccessful
attempts to amend.
For example, Article 5 provides:
All states have the right to associate in organizations of primary commodity producers
in order to develop their national economies to achieve stable financing for their development, and in pursuance of their aims assisting in the promotion of sustained growth
of the world economy, in particular accelerating the development of developing countries.

'Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
"Other references to coercion in the Charter should be noted. Article 5 places on all States the
duty to respect the right to form "organizations of primary commodity producers" by refraining
from applying "economic and political measures that would limit it." Similarly Article 17 requires
that foreign assistance to developing countries be "free of any conditions derogating from their
sovereignty." Finally, Article 16 defines as "coercive policies" the following: "colonialism,
apartheid, racial discrimination, neo-colonialism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation
and domination and the economic and social consequences thereof."
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Article 5 reinforces this right by imposing a duty on States outside the cartel to
"respect that right by refraining from applying economic and political measures
that would limit it," presumably even if the cartel is guilty of coercion under
international law, and regardless of whether such "measures" themselves
constitute coercion. The last sentence of Article 7 further reinforces this right by
imposing on States a duty "to cooperate in order to eliminate obstacles that
hinder" the mobilization and use by another State of its resources through
the means of its choosing. Eleven countries moved for deletion of Article 5 from
the text of the Charter during the Second Committee debates, 78 but their
79
resolution was defeated 98-15-8.
The right to form cartels was further bolstered by Article 6, which promotes
the conclusion of long-term multilateral commodity agreements, "taking into
account the interests of producers and consumers." The same countries that
opposed cartels (less the Netherlands) proposed a text which would have
especially encouraged "the regular flow of raw material supplies" and placed
contain limitations on long-term multilateral commodity agreements, as
follows: 10
All States shall be prepared to study and negotiate as appropriate world-wide commodity agreements on a case-by-case basis, which should cover as many producers and
consumers as possible and a substantial part of the trade involved. All States should
endeavor to promote the regular flow of raw material supplies, including agricultural
and industrial raw material supplies, having regard to the particular economic circumstances of individual countries, at stable, remunerative and equitable prices, thus contributing to the development of the world economy while taking into account, in particular, the interests of developing countries.
1
This amendment was defeated 95-1710.8
The provision in Article 6 that "All states share the responsibility to promote
the regular flow and access of all commercial goods traded at stable, remunerative and equitable prices" is also matched by other articles emphasizing the
developing countries' desire to maintain the highest price level in order to be
able to finance their own imports. Thus Article 14 also emphasizes "stable,
equitable and remunerative prices for primary products." Article 28 specifically
imposes a duty on all States to achieve "adjustments in the prices of exports of
developing countries in relation to prices of their imports. . . ." Here, too, the
patience of the developed countries was strained. Nine developed countries

"Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States (but, notably, neither
Australia nor Canada, both producers of primary resources for export). Report of the Second
Committee, supra note 2 at 17.
'id. at 22.
'1d. at 17.
"Id. at 23.
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proposed to the Second Committee that Article 28 be deleted from the
Charter," but the move was defeated 101-12-11. 83
In a final attempt to redress the balance in this area eleven industrialized
countries moved to delete the broadly stated Article 31 duty "to contribute to
the balanced expansion of the world economy" and in place thereof to insert
following Article 14 a new article which would have emphasized the maintenance of a "balance between the interests of raw material producer and
consumer countries." 84 This amendment, too, was defeated, 97-15-10.11
Miscellaneous Charter Provisions
It is perhaps too much to hope that any multilateral negotiations of the
duration and complexity of those in which the Charter gestated could avoid
addressing some politically appealing but minimally relevant issues. Inevitably,
then, the developing world felt constrained once more to introduce in Article 16
the theory popular with developing countries that there should be restitution for
the economic and social consequences of "colonialism, apartheid, racial
discrimination, neo-colonialism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation
and domination." This provision would patently expand international law,
especially in paragraph 2, which provides that, "No State has the right to
promote or encourage investments that may constitute an obstacle to the
liberation of a territory occupied by force," a provision evidently having its
origins in the current situation in southern Africa. Attempts to delete Article
16,86 largely because of its irrelevance and its potential for fostering the creation
of radical new international law without full and proper consideration of all the
ramifications, failed. 87
Disarmament, too, secured a place in the Charter, namely Article 15, which
imposes a duty on all States "to promote the achievement of general and
complete disarmament under effective international control" and to utilize the
resources so freed for economic and social development, especially "for the
development needs of developing countries." An attempt was made also to
delete this article, 8 8 and likewise was defeated, although by a smaller majority
than generally characterized votes on Charter provisions, i.e., 76-22-24. 89
"Id. at 18.
"Id. at 23.
"Id. at 18.
"Id. at 23. A discussion of the articles relating to natural resources should not fail to take note of
Article 3. It provides, where natural resources are shared by two or more countries, for cooperation
and consultations "inorder to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing damage to
the legitimate interest of others." It attracted an unually high number of negative votes and
abstentions, passing 97-7-25 (Id. at 25).
"Id. at 18.
"Id. at 23.
"Id. at 18.
"Id. at 23.
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Two other extraneous subjects, law of the sea and environment, were grouped
under a separate chapter heading (III), "Common responsibilities towards the
international community," without any opposing votes. 90 Article 29 regarding
the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof does not appear to go beyond
Resolution 2749 of the U.N. General Assembly,91 and is doubtless meant to
provide additional ammunition for the developing countries at the Third U.N.
Law of the Sea Conference. Article 30 calling for the "protection, preservation
and the enhancement of the environment for the present and future
generations" is perhaps more troublesome because of its qualifying proviso that
"the environmental policies of all States should enhance and not adversely
affect the present and future development potential of developing countries."
Final Provisions
Articles 31 and 32, appearing under "Final Provisions" in the Charter, have
already been discussed. Article 33 provides that nothing in the Charter shall be
construed as impairing or derogating from the provisions of the U.N. Charter 9
"or actions taken in pursuance thereof." 93 Article 34 provides for reconsideration of the Charter at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly in the fall of
1975 and thereafter on the agenda of every fifth session.
Conclusion
The Charter represents one means by which the developing countries,
through the use of UNCTAD's and the General Assembly's one-nation-onevote system, attempt to overcome the divergence of assumptions between
developed and developing countries that has frustrated them in GATT, IMF
and other fora where developed countries are more predominant. Even if they
are able to pass resolutions purportedly imposing duties on developed States,
however, it is not realistic for them to do so in view of the dependence of any
development program on technology and other outside assistance which must,

9Id. at 25.

'Declaration of Principle Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
9'1n light of the references to international law in the U.N. Charter (e.g., Preamble, paragraph 3
and Article 1, paragraph 1), this provision could serve as the basis for arguing that the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States is in fact subject to international law, but it may be
questioned whether this is a wholly adequate recognition.
"However, it may be unclear what actions are intended to be considered in pursuance of the U.N.
Charter. It is clear by way of legislative history that the Working Group rejected (i) texts proposed
by Iraq and the Philippines at its third session which would have included specific reference at this
point to U.N. resolutions and (ii) a text proposed by Iraq which would have included specific
reference to economic sanctions imposed by the U.N. in accordance with its Charter or the right of
States to take similar measures individually or collectively in legitimate self-defense according to
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter (Third Report, supra note 28 at 21).
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in the long run, come from the developed countries. There is not sufficient
reciprocity of interests to persuade the developed States to be legally bound by
all the terms of the Charter.
The developed world must take into consideration the viewpoints of the less
developed nations, and their claim to full participation in the international
lawmaking process. Experience indicates that even on the apparently obdurate
issue of protection of foreign investments, adjustment, compromise, and
settlement on mutually acceptable terms will continue to be possible. For their
part, the developing States might consider the benefits of the protection and
assistance traditionally accorded them through effective international law and
organizations.
If the Charter is demonstrative of the likely quality of generalized efforts in
the future, the very complex and controversial issues covered by the Charter
would continue to be better resolved through specialized and pragmatic
negotiations. During the course of negotiations on the Charter, and at the time
of its adoption, many parties expressed concern both (1) as to the failure of the
Charter to provide that the rights and duties memorialized therein were
intended to be subject to international law, and (2) that the Charter had come to
represent an attempt by the developing countries to withdraw from existing fora
certain issues in which they were particularly interested or to prejudice or
infuence such fora in a direction they might not have otherwise taken. Those
concerns were expressed, for example, in the resolution of the American Bar
Association and in the activities of the ABA Subcommittee on Economic Rights
and Duties which took place under such resolution. It was based upon such
concerns that the United States voted, with deep regret, against the adoption by
the General Assembly of the Charter as a whole.
Such a result is made doubly unfortunate by the fact that agreement was
achieved on many broad issues. Perhaps if further time had been taken for the
resolution of the few issues which remained in dispute at the time of the
adoption of the Charter a universally acceptable Charter could have beer
achieved. Hopefully, between now and the next formal consideration of the
Charter at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, pursuant to Article 34
of the Charter, informal consultations among the parties concerned can achieve
the few, but important, revisions of the Charter necessary to generate universal
accord.
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